COMMENTARY: Disaster relief & the interests of the U.S. national security 
state and of ExxonMobiil

[Given their global reach, it was inevitable that the interests of the U.S. 
national security state and the deeply intertwined interests of the global oil 
industry should play an important part in the current struggle to get aid to 
the tsunami victims on the shores of the Indian Ocean.  --  Abigail Abrash 
Walton and Bama Athreya, longtime observers of the Indonesian scene, are now 
reporting that “the Indonesian government and military have facilitated the 
movement of . . . extremist groups into Aceh” in order to justify their own 
activities in the region, and that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
in the neo-Orwellian fashion so dear to him, is attempting under the cover of 
the “war on terrorism” in Indonesia to reinforce much-criticized U.S. ties 
with the notorious Indonesian military.  --  For more on the subject of the 
TNI (the acronym by which the Indonesian military is known), see a chapter by 
ace *Washington Post* Pentagon reporter Dana Priest on U.S.-Indonesian 
military relations in her recent book, *The Mission*.  --  “Indonesia became 
[in the 1990s],” writes Priest, “a case study in how persistent CinCs in the 
Pacific, and their supporters in the Pentagon, worked around congressional and 
State Department roadblocks to maintain military ties” (*The Mission: Waging 
War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military* [W.W. Norton, 2003], pp. 
218-19).  --  The piece below was first posted on the Foreign Policy in Focus 
web site and was reposted Friday on Asia Times Online.  --  Thanks to Mark 
Nagel for sending this report.  --Mark]

http://www.ufppc.org/content/view/2121/

FPIF Policy Report

U.S. TIES AND CHALLENGES TO PEACE IN ACEH
By Abigail Abrash Walton and Bama Athreya

Foreign Policy in Focus
January 2005

http://www.fpif.org/papers/PR2005aceh.html
or
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GA21Ae01.html (Jan. 21, 2005)

Aceh, so long isolated from international view by the Indonesian government 
and military, is now -- tragically -- at the center of world attention.  
Members of the U.S. Congress and their staff, United Nations officials, 
journalists, and humanitarian aid workers have arrived on the scene after 
years of blocked access.  These shifts offer the administration of U.S. 
President George W. Bush and other actors an unprecedented opportunity for 
peace-building and enhancement of human security and stability in a region 
dominated by violent conflict for decades.

This report analyzes three key factors in responding effectively to the 
challenges of emergency aid and reconstruction efforts as well as long-term 
sustainable development and conflict resolution:  1) the role of the 
Indonesian military (TNI) in aid delivery and in ending the ongoing conflict; 
2) the differences between Aceh's indigenous insurgents (Free Aceh Movement or 
GAM) and newly arriving extremist Islamic militias; and 3) the role of 
ExxonMobil in the province.

SHORTSIGHTED U.S. OPPORTUNISM IN THE FACE OF DISASTER?

In the aftermath of the massive earthquake and tsunami that devastated much of 
Aceh, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is pushing yet again the Bush 
administration's frustrated desire to strengthen ties with the Indonesian 
military over the well-grounded objections of the U.S. Congress, as cemented 
in U.S. law.  In his trademark Orwellian rhetoric, the secretary argues that 
such a move is essential to winning the "global war on terror."  This myopic 
logic ignores the numerous reports documenting the Indonesian military as a de 
facto terrorist entity with a long track record of undermining human security 
in Aceh and other parts of Indonesia as well as near-daily news reports about 
the TNI's control-happy undermining of emergency relief efforts.

Indeed, the U.S. State Department's 2003 Indonesia country report notes, 
"Security-force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily 
detained civilians . . . Human-rights abuses were most apparent in Aceh . . . 
however, no security-force members have been prosecuted for unlawful killings 
in Aceh . . . Retired and active-duty military officers who were known to have 
committed serious human-rights violations occupy or have been promoted to 
senior positions in both the government and the TNI."

The TNI is also a massively corrupt institution, relying on its private 
business interests for an estimated two-thirds of its annual budget.  The 
TNI's businesses include illegal logging, drug production and trafficking, and 
prostitution, as well as "security" payments, viewed by many as extortion, 
from Indonesian and U.S. businesses.  ExxonMobil reportedly pays the military 
about US$6 million per year for "security" at its Aceh natural-gas operations; 
Louisiana-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc paid the Indonesian 
military and police at its West Papua mines $10.7 million during a recent 
two-year period.  These relationships with the TNI have cost U.S. 
multinationals and their shareholders both in terms of reputation and 
financial liabilities resulting from associated TNI human-rights abuses.

New legislation requires the TNI to abandon its economic activities within the 
next five years -- a crucial yet challenging undertaking that will require 
consistent backing by the international community to Indonesia's civilian 
reformers, not the business-as-usual stance proffered by normalization of 
military relations.

When will policymakers grasp the common-sense wisdom "With friends like these, 
who needs enemies?"  Attempting to build working relationships with 
human-rights abusers with agendas and interests of their own is a long-failed 
policy that costs lives rather than saves them.  U.S. support and assistance 
-- financial and political -- are best channeled to civilian-led emergency 
aid, good governance, and development programs.

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND THE THREAT TO AID DELIVERY

Because of its territorial command structure, which gives it bases of 
operation from the village level up, the TNI would in theory be the 
best-placed Indonesian institution to provide disaster relief.  However, the 
TNI cannot play an effective leadership role in disaster relief and 
reconstruction for numerous reasons.  Its brutal reputation, gained during 
years of unfettered human-rights atrocities against Aceh's civilians, has 
hindered the TNI's effectiveness by casting grave and well-founded suspicion 
on the military playing any sort of unsupervised or managerial aid role.

By severely restricting the movements of aid workers and unilaterally setting 
an arbitrary March 26 deadline for the departure of U.S. and other foreign 
troops assisting with disaster relief, the TNI has further lost credibility as 
an institution capable of meeting the needs and challenges confronting 
disaster survivors.  Instead, the TNI's overriding mission of destroying the 
estimated few thousand GAM fighters in the region -- and the TNI's interest in 
sustaining the conflict so as to continue to profit from the region's war 
economy -- constitute a conflict of interest that irreparably undermines aid 
work.

In recent days, the international press has reported that foreign aid workers 
to Indonesia will be restricted to two areas:  Banda Aceh and Meulaboh.  The 
Indonesian military has claimed that it cannot guarantee the safety of 
foreigners in any other part of the province, alleging GAM might at any time 
attack foreigners in other parts of the province.  The alleged GAM threat is a 
red herring, meant to prevent foreign aid workers, journalists, and other 
observers from witnessing the TNI's ongoing military offensive in Aceh's inner 
regions even since the disaster of December 26 or from hearing the stories of 
survivors of pre-disaster human-rights abuses.

GAM has issued statements declaring a unilateral ceasefire (though fighters in 
the field say they will return fire if the TNI strikes first) and also 
declaring its intent not to fire on civilian aid workers of any nationality.  
Adding to the credibility of these statements is the simple fact that GAM 
members believe that a foreign presence throughout Aceh ultimately benefits 
their cause.  While GAM has indeed engaged in violence against Indonesian 
forces and, on occasion, civilians in the past, the group has no record of 
aggression against foreigners.

It is important for international audiences to understand that anti-foreign, 
violent Islamic elements do exist in Indonesia, but these forces are not GAM.  
There are a number of other extremist Islamic groups that operate in 
Indonesia, although historically these groups have had no presence in Aceh.  
However, within the past several weeks, the Indonesian government and military 
have facilitated the movement of these extremist groups into Aceh.  It is 
crucial for the international donor community to recognize the past role of 
the Indonesian military in aiding and abetting such groups, and the present 
interest the military may have in maintaining such groups' presence in Aceh as 
a proxy base for its military operations against GAM.

In fact, the TNI has a documented record of using proxy militia groups to 
engage in violence in East Timor and elsewhere.  A 2002 study for the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School notes that the Indonesian army has become "a major 
facilitator of terrorism" due to "radical Muslim militias they . . . 
organized, trained, and financed."  The study adds that the military gave one 
terrorist group an estimated $9.3 million "embezzled from its defense budget."
 According to a Congressional Research Service report first released in 2002 
and updated in 2004, "Radical groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic 
Defenders Front . . . received assistance from elements within the Indonesian 
military in organizing [and] securing arms and transport to locales throughout 
the Indonesian archipelago."

The Islamic Defenders Front -- known for its violent attacks on Jakarta 
nightclubs -- as well as Laskar Mujahidin, the security wing of the Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), have established a presence in Aceh reportedly to 
support Islamic law and tradition in the region during aid relief efforts 
there.  MMI once was headed by Jemaah Islamiah (JI) leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 
who is currently on trial for his alleged role in the 2002 bombing of a Bali 
nightclub in which 202 people were killed and a 2003 blast that killed 12 
people at the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta.  JI reportedly also is responsible 
for a 2004 bombing at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

In maintaining a coherent position in promoting peace in the region, 
governments and other institutions providing disaster aid should not shy away 
from protesting the entrance into Aceh of outfits with a documented history of 
violence.

CORPORATE GOOD CITIZENSHIP:  ExxonMobil IN ACEH

Multinational corporations based in Indonesia, including ExxonMobil, Newmont 
and Unocal, have given generously to assist relief efforts in the region.  
However, in view of the unparalleled and, in many ways, destabilizing role 
that ExxonMobil has played in Aceh over the years, it is incumbent on the 
corporation to do more.

ExxonMobil currently faces a multimillion-dollar lawsuit, filed by the 
Washington, DC-based International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) on behalf of 
Acehnese villagers who were tortured and murdered by the TNI on ExxonMobil's 
premises.  Concerned about its investments, the city of New York has filed a 
shareholder resolution with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
calling on ExxonMobil management to report on the details of the company's 
financial relationship with the TNI.

What did ExxonMobil do?  The Arun gas field in North Sumatra is one of the 
world's largest sources of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and ExxonMobil Corp. 
(originally Mobil Oil Corp) has had a contract with the government of 
Indonesia since 1969 to process LNG from this site.

There have been credible reports that ExxonMobil Corp, along with its 
predecessor companies, hired TNI military units to provide "security" for the 
company's Arun project.  The result has been TNI-perpetrated torture, murder, 
rape, and other acts of terror against the local population.  In some cases, 
the TNI used ExxonMobil equipment or facilities to conduct the torture and to 
dispose of those killed.  For example, one of the plaintiffs in the ILRF case 
was "disappeared" for a period of three months, during which time he was 
repeatedly beaten and tortured with electric shocks.  He was then taken to an 
open pit where he was shown a large pile of human heads.  He was told that he 
would be killed and his head would be added to the pile.  He was eventually 
released, but soldiers burned down his home thereafter.  Another plaintiff, 
who was several months pregnant, was raped and beaten by a soldier who forced 
his way into her home.  These examples are typical of the stories of dozens of 
innocent civilians living around the ExxonMobil area of operations.

The ExxonMobil facilities were not significantly damaged by the tsunami, 
thanks to concrete barriers that had been erected long ago to protect the 
site.  The company's gas-extraction operations are ongoing, and ExxonMobil 
personnel reportedly are continuing to work in the area without problems.  
However, despite the announcement of a $5 million donation to relief efforts, 
the company has been silent regarding its own role in facilitating relief 
operations in the Lhoksumawe area.  The Indonesian military has denied access 
to Lhoksumawe to foreign relief workers, supposedly on the grounds that the 
TNI cannot protect foreigners' safety in that area, but no such restrictions 
have been placed on ExxonMobil employees.  ExxonMobil owns its own airstrip at 
the site, but it is unclear whether the company has offered to make it 
available to facilitate aid delivery by humanitarian workers or whether 
ExxonMobil intends to provide meaningful assistance to reconstruction efforts.

The company owes far more to the people of Aceh than a mere $5 million 
donation.  ExxonMobil reportedly has extracted some $40 billion from its Arun 
gas operations during the past decade alone, including earnings of an 
estimated $2 billion annually in recent years.  ExxonMobil's role as a major 
player not only in Aceh, but also in terms of Indonesia's national economy and 
the other U.S.-based multinationals operating there, makes the company a 
stakeholder with unmatched clout.  (ExxonMobil executive Robert Haines serves 
as chairperson of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council's Indonesia subgroup and led 
a high-level delegation to Jakarta early last month to meet with Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and other top-ranking government 
officials.)  The company should use its resources and influence to advocate 
that foreign aid workers be given access to the area, facilitate their 
transport and delivery of aid and, on a broader scale, encourage the 
Indonesian government to move toward a ceasefire and resumption of peace talks 
with GAM as an absolutely vital condition to aid delivery and long-term 
security throughout the province.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the response to the tsunami contributes to both short-term 
relief and long-term peace and security for the people of Aceh, the Bush 
administration must support Indonesian efforts at strengthening the country's 
civilian democratic governance and military reform.  Above all else, this 
means ensuring that in the immediate and near term, the TNI plays a limited, 
non-managerial role in relief efforts.  For example, Indonesian military 
personnel could usefully employ the TNI's logistical infrastructure to provide 
transport of aid under the direction of local civilian government and 
Indonesian and international humanitarian organizations.

The Bush administration should support efforts by the UN as well as 
international and local humanitarian organizations to provide long-term 
reconstruction assistance in Aceh.  For recovery and reconstruction to be 
effective, fighting in the region must end.  The task of building peace in 
Aceh is complex but, at a minimum, the U.S. and other members of the 
international community must prioritize a ceasefire between the TNI and GAM, 
insist on demilitarization of the province, and once again vigorously support 
peace talks.  Indeed, Germany has explicitly linked its massive aid pledge to 
President Yudhoyono's stated commitment to pursue a peaceful solution to the 
conflict in Aceh.

As the largest debtor among the countries hit by the tsunami, Indonesia puts 
roughly 25% of its annual revenues toward debt repayment to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and wealthy countries such as the United 
States and Japan.  The Bush administration should support an immediate, 
interest-free debt moratorium and the convening of an International Debt 
Conference.  A moratorium will enable the Indonesian government to undertake 
emergency aid and reconstruction planning; a conference is needed to develop 
an effective and comprehensive approach to Indonesia's massive $132 billion 
external debt burden, much of it accrued during the corrupt, 32-year regime of 
ousted military dictator Suharto.  Coordinated by an independent institution 
such as the U.N. Development Program, and based on independent research, the 
conference would assess the sustainability of current debt repayments with 
respect to immediate disaster relief as well as the country's overall poverty 
reduction and development goals.  These measures should enable the Indonesian 
government to meet the new challenges of effective emergency aid and 
reconstruction without having to enter into more debt slavery or by escalating 
exploitation of Indonesia's unique and sensitive natural environment.

To combat terrorism effectively, the US arguably needs the friendship of 
Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation.  Aceh's natural disaster 
offers an unprecedented opportunity for enhanced long-term human security.  
The way to achieve these goals is not by building ties with the very elements 
that engage in destructive violence there.  It is by demonstrating that the 
United States is ready to contribute materially to peace-building, sustainable 
development and democratic reform.

--Abigail Abrash Walton is on the faculty at Antioch New England Graduate 
School and has monitored conditions in Indonesia since 1993.  Bama Athreya is 
deputy director of the International Labor Rights Fund.  Both are regular 
contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.